It's Almost Supernatural

Letter to the bloggers: Whither the single state solution?

A regular reader of this blog, Ruth Bennett, has sent us an email asking if we would publish a letter she has written in defense of a single-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While we strongly disagree with this view, we think that it is not something that can just be dismissed out of hand, particularly when it comes from someone who claims to be affiliated with the mainstream in the South African Jewish community. We need to engage with Ruth’s concerns.

And so in the spirit of open debate that we have been trying to foster, and as a continuation of our crossing swords debates we have decided to post her letter together with my reply. I am sure this will extract an emotional response from other readers. We call on them not to shy away from expressing their views but to try and be respectful. Let’s see if we can play the ball and not the woman here.

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Exploring the one-state solution

“Everyday Jews, Muslims and Christians mourn the loss of another innocent life in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. South Africa has been held up as an example to the Middle East of how to attain democracy peacefully. What is strange about the use of the South African model is that some pivotal aspects of the nature of change in this country are completely ignored. The most important of which is that upon the establishment of the new South Africa, the country did not fragment like the Balkans states. One nation, one vote, many cultures and people define this country. Yet, a two-state solution is still touted as the only means of resolving the conflict in the Middle East.

I have long believed that the establishment of a one state in which Judaism, Islam and Christianity are all equally recognized is the only real solution. With three major world religions laying claim to the land, surely it is more sensible to establish one state?

Advocates of the one-state solution have been accused of calling for the destruction of the State of Israel. Yet, they forget that the one-state solution calls as much for the destruction of the state of Palestine as it does Israel.

If it were so easy to establish two states co-existing peacefully, then surely this would have been created a long time ago? As long as the two-state solution is seen as the only means of resolution, there will always be questions about:

• the boundaries of the Palestinian state: pre-1948 or 1967 borders?
• The settlements in the West Bank
• Control of Jerusalem

These are the issues that prevent any meaningful dialogue and negotiations. As long as these questions remain, there will never be peace in Israel and her people will continue to live in fear.

Why do we fear a single state encompassing Israel and Palestine? Are we trying to protect the “Jewish” nature of Israel? I find this hard to believe when one considers that the vast majority of Jews in Israel are secular. Most of the immigrants, especially from the former Soviet Union are not even considered Jewish by Orthodox standards. Whose Jewish state is this?

For far too long, there has been a blind acceptance worldwide that two states will solve the problem. It won’t, and the terror from both sides will continue.

Before I am labelled a ‘self-hating Jew’, ‘anti-Semite’ and other names so favoured by many readers of this blog, I would like to point out that I am an observant, Orthodox Jew. I am proud of my Jewish identity and heritage. As a descendant of a Holocaust survivor, I feel that I must speak out. It is my Jewish responsibility.

I trust that we will be able to have an intelligent, decent discussion about the option of a unitary state.”

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Why I oppose a single–state solution

Ruth Bennett’s letter in support of a one-state solution fails to take into account many important aspects of Jewish history and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Firstly, it must be pointed out that the majority of Palestinians and Israelis support a 2 state solution. The peace polls over the years have consistently shown this (see here). Surely imposing a solution that both peoples oppose is not only anti-democratic but is also impractical. An agreement that does not have the support of both parties will never be successfully implemented.

Secondly, a one-state solution denies both the Jewish and Palestinian people the right to national self determination. The fact that both parties are denied such a right does not make this denial more legitimate. When applying a human rights approach to the conflict, which I support, there will have to be some limitations of rights. But the key is to find a solution that reduces the infringements to a minimum. Both people need to make difficult compromises as part of a 2 state solution. Both need to give up their claim to sovereignty over the entire land of Israel. But surely some sovereignty for each party is better than nothing for both.

Thirdly, given the bloody history of Jewish-Arab relations in a unitary state and the extent of the current animosity, a one-state solution is completely impractical. Ruth does not specify the legal framework for the one state solution. But under any alternative, Jews would become a minority in the land of Israel. Without control of the army or police-force how would they ensure their security? The state of minority Christian communities in the region gives us some insight into what the most likely fate would be for a Jewish minority in the land of Israel. Lebanon provides a bloody historical example of the failure of bi-nationalism in the Middle East. The terror inflicted on Palestinian Christians particularly in Hamas controlled Gaza on a daily basis is surely not something any Jew in their right mind would wish to accept.

And the hatred towards Jews is so much worse. Historically, look at the massacre of the centuries old Jewish community of Hebron in the 1920’s by Palestinian forces. More recently, look at the horrific acts of destruction that have been carried out on Jewish religious sites under Palestinian control. When Israel withdrew from Gaza, Palestinians gleefully desecrated the synagogues left behind. There is a serious risk and without the power of a Jewish force to keep them at bay these same elements would destroy much more Jewish property throughout Israel.

Fourthly, Israel has over the last 6 decades become an important vessel for Jewish identity both in the state and in the Diaspora. While Ruth is right that the majority of Israelis are secular, they still have a very strong Jewish national identity. Judaism is not only a religion but also a people-hood. Being secular does not take away from a person’s sense of belonging to the Jewish people. Secular Israelis just express their Jewish identity in a different way. For them being Jewish is going to the army to defend the Jewish state or supporting the Israeli soccer team. For many Jews in the Diaspora, Israel is a source of tremendous pride and an important way for them to connect to the Jewish people. The success of the birthright program is one example. Even for those Jewish critics of Israel, the existence of the Jewish state is one of the only things that keep them involved in Jewish affairs, albeit in a negative sense. Dissolving the state would destroy this link to Jewish indentify for millions of people. This is certainly something that someone, who claims to be interested in the survival of the Jewish people, could not support.

It is tempting for many South Africans to see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the prism of their own experience. While of course there are important lessons that can be learned from the South African experience, importing our solution wholesale is extremely naïve and dangerous. We need to examine the issues that exist in that region and try to address them. The fact that we are still in the process of working out a 2 state solution does not mean that it is by definition defunct. No-one said it will be easy. Issues like borders and Jerusalem are difficult but they can, with some comprise, be solved. They are not the stumbling blocks to peace. Trust and the capacity to implement agreements are the real problems. A one-state solution would solve none of them.

Previously at IAS

• Crossing Swords: Joel Pollak vs. Doron Isaacs

Israeli leaders prepared to give up on its dreams; where are the Palestinians?

Almost answering my previous question on "what type of Israel to we want?" the Israeli Knesset has passed a bill compensating settlers who voluntarily leave Judea and Samaria.

According to the bill NIS 1.1 million will be given to each family that voluntarily moves from isolated areas of Judea and Samaria to the Negev. Vice Premier Haim Ramon said that 18% of the settlers east of the security fence were prepared to leave of their own accord.

Speaking at the cabinet meeting, Ehud Olmert said that the idea of "Greater Israel" was over.

'Greater Israel' is finished. There is no such thing as that anymore. Whoever talks in those terms is only deluding himself," said the prime minister at the weekly cabinet during which Vice Premier Haim Ramon's evacuation-compensation bill was discussed. "It doesn't help Israel. The international community has changed its perspective ahead of the possibility of Israel becoming a bi-national state. We can prove that we were always the initiators and were more creative and that it was the other side that was more stubborn. However, as usual, we are winning the argument but are gradually going to lose the most important thing," he said. Olmert explained that although excellent justifications could be brought as to why talk of of concessions to the Palestinians should be postponed, time was "not ticking in Israel's favor." Olmert admitted that he had changed his mind on the subject. "I admit that I didn't always have this opinion. I thought and I also said to [Defense Minister] Ehud Barak that the concessions he offered at Camp David were exaggerated. I believed that the land from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean was all ours since in every place there that is excavated, there is evidence of Jewish History. "But finally, after a lot of suffering and misgivings, I came to the conclusion that we need to share the land with whom we are residing if we don't want to become a bi-national state." The prime minister emphasized that Israel was the strongest country in the region. "We are strong like no other country in the region, no entity can overcome us," he said. "The strategic threats don't come from questions of where the borders are. We can argue over every small detail but we will then have no peace partner and no international backing. We will just feel that we were right, as we have done for the last 40 years."

Israeli leaders have almost always been willing to give up on parts of their dreams in order to compromise with their protagonists. In contrast; the Palestinian leaders never change and continue to hold out for total victory, that is, for the destruction of the Jewish state.

Former US envoy to the Middle East Dennis Ross used to say that to achieve peace Israel must be willing to give up control and the Palestinians must be willing to accept compromise.

Well Israel is willing to give up control. They showed this during Oslo, they showed this when they evacuated Gaza, and this new bill is further evidence supporting this concept. The problem is that the Palestinians haven't moved and are still unable to accept compromise.

Also significant is that steps like this condition the Israeli public for peace (and unfortunately probably also, as Shaul Mofaz argues, raise Palestinian demands). How do the Palestinian leaders condition their public for peace? I would love for one of the members of the SA 'human rights' delegation to inform us.

Doron Isaacs responds to criticism of the Human Rights Delegation

Its always been our policy to allow people we criticise the chance to respond and so in that vein I present to you, a response from Doron Isaacs, one of the leaders of the SA Human Rights Delegation, to my earlier criticism...which I must add, I still stand by.

Human Rights Delegation: Shooting the messenger

They call it the right of reply, but I nevertheless appreciate it. Moreover, I appreciate the criticism itself, because it opens up the issues and allows us to discuss them. A problematic pattern though, is that the mode, motivations, and individual members of the delegation come under attack, whilst the glaring crisis in Israel/Palestine – about which we can disagree – receives too little critical attention. Some of the criticism has validity, but much of it is wrong. I’ll reply and then return to the reality we need to talk about.

You dismiss our intentions to improve Jewish-Muslim relations in South Africa. As you’ve said:

They blame only Israel for the problems; they lecture only the Jewish community about softening their positions; they investigate only Israeli abuses of Palestinian human rights.

That is false. We have consistently pointed to Palestinian targeting of Israeli civilians as being a fundamental violation of Israeli human rights and as being central to all the problems. A careful review of the written and spoken output will confirm this. As I said in a public lecture at UCT:

Everything I saw over the five days, including discussions with people that have used both violence and non-violence, cemented a view already formed, through years of work on this issue in Cape Town, that … violence against civilians, has been a disaster for Palestinians. It has been a politically bankrupt strategy that has come at a terrible moral cost. As Nathan Geffen said on Monday night in Bokaap, the net effect of suicide bombing has been to kill off the once-vibrant Israeli peace camp, and to strengthen the right around the world.

That deals also with your second point: we do not ‘lecture’ only Jewish audiences. Nathan made the points more strongly in Bo Kaap, and in a face to face meeting with the Muslim Judicial Council, as did Jonathan Berger on Radio Islam, where he spoke about the line between criticism of Israel and antisemitism. What about the human touch? I spoke about my grandmother who was in the Netanya shopping mall when a bomb exploded.

Earlier you wrote that the trip was “devoid of any context”. How does this square with the lectures we heard by Hillel Cohen and Amos Goldberg of Hebrew University and Ben Gurion University of the Negev, respectively; the lengthy tour through Yad Vashem; the discussions with the Chief Justice of Israel; the former Deputy Attorney General; the former Deputy Mayor of Jerusalem; the meeting with families whose children were killed in bombings and shootings?

One of the group, Farid Esack, a wonderfully interesting professor of religion at Harvard, wrote about the trip for the Al Qalam, a Muslim monthly. He writes humorously of being subjected to “the insufferably boring lamentations of some Fatah apparatchiks”, of how he “came back with a renewed commitment to listen to the narratives of others”, of how he “could not avoid the conclusion that the simple Zionism=Apartheid equation is also a simplistic one.”

Why is this ignored by our critics? Would recognising that our eyes are open to Israeli suffering and Palestinian crimes make our condemnation of the occupation irresistible? Perhaps all of us have been subjected to ideologically perverted debate – in both directions – for so long, that we assume that everyone must fall into one of two unhelpful camps?

You allow that “a large majority of the community needs to be challenged regarding its positions on Israel and the occupation in particular.” Must all criticism be ‘balanced’ to your or my liking? Or sufficiently ‘complex’? As Farid reminds us: “The argument of complexity can become a weapon in the hands of the powerful to disarm the weak and those who act in solidarity with them.” Complexity is venerable, but it comes after both accuracy and honesty.

Has the response to this delegation confirmed the contention that there is “lots of “space” in the Jewish community for criticism of the occupation”? How does calling Nathan Geffen a liar – “who is he trying to kid?” – help to create a pluralistic, tolerant Jewish community where political problems are discussed on their merits?

We’ve been wrongly accused of not providing a context. Surely all those who defend Israel’s actions need context, need to know of the dispossession, the inability to move, the unemployment, the hunger, the forced entry into homes, the indignity at the hands of the IDF, that Palestinians suffer daily? As many Israelis say, unbridled defence, of the variety offered by the Chief Rabbi, entrenches the occupation and thus actually hurts Israel. Pointing to Israel’s wrongs, whilst painful, is necessary to support the forces of peace.

We need to know what the occupation is before we seek to justify it. As we have accurately reported: There are hundreds of kilometers of roads upon which Palestinians cannot drive – called “sterile” by the military commander – these do not secure Israel, but convenience settlers. The separate water, electricity and legal systems operate in the same way. All of this, along with the postal, education and, of course, security services offered to the settlements – including what the Israeli government calls ‘illegal outposts’ – comes at an enormous financial, moral and human cost to Israel, not to mention its terrible impact on Palestinian life. Can we not simply say that all this, like suicide-bombing, is shameful and must end?

Your interesting blog has devoted well over 4000 words to our efforts. I’ll leave this response here. I hope we can continue this conversation in the future. When will It's Almost Supernatural host a public debate on this issue?

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Doron Isaacs lives in Cape Town and coordinates Equal Education, a community-based campaign for better schools in South Africa.

Previously at IAS

• The lofty goals of the human rights delegation to Israel
• Pollak on the human rights delegation
• The branches in this Forrest only grow on one side
• SA Human Rights Delegation fails to strike the right balance
• Real world tramples on human rights delegation

The Lofty Goals of the Human Rights Delegation to Israel

The recent South African ‘human rights delegation’ to Israel continues to attract enormous attention in the South African public space. Talks at private homes and at universities, air-time on the radio, and editorials and opinion pieces in newspapers have ensured maximum exposure of the delegates' opinions. As a propaganda piece, the mission continues to excel. In terms of fomenting a greater understanding of the conflict, apart from a few astute exceptions (most notably Justice Edwin Cameron), the mission was, in my opinion, a miserable failure.

I spoke to a couple of people who attended the address by the delegation at Wits University last week. The address, they said, brought nothing new to the debate; instead it just rehashed the old Israel-bashing rhetoric to which we have become so accustomed.

The view from people who attended a private invite-only address at a residence in Houghton last week was slightly more positive, thanks mainly to Justice Edwin Cameron. It seems that different messages are disseminated depending on the audience – at least in terms of the selection of speakers. Edwin Cameron is selected for a private predominantly Jewish audience; whilst Mondli Makhanya (Israel is evil!) is selected for a far wider public audience.

Yesterday, the Cape Times did well to provide two opposing views regarding the delegation. Nathan Geffen’s article (“we have a duty to speak out”) was overshadowed by a masterful article by Joel Pollak who, whilst volunteering for the Association for Civil Rights in Israel last year, went on many of the tours that the delegation experienced (“South African mission went wearing blinkers and predictably found what it was looking for”).

I found Geffen’s article profoundly absurd. He writes as one of the three primary organisers of the tour and sets about explaining the lofty goals of the mission. Geffen subtly claims that the delegation has been successful in its mission to “create space, in the South African Jewish community, for views critical of the occupation.” He goes on to say that “It has not been easy in the past to express dissent in the community without vilification.”

I disagree. First off, there is lots of “space” in the Jewish community for criticism of the occupation. This year at Limmud, Gershon Gorenberg, author of the seminal book on the occupation, entitled “The occupation, the untold story of Israel’s settlements”, will be speaking. The Jewish community has previously hosted other outspoken critics of the occupation working to bring about its end, most notably former anti-apartheid activist Benjamin Pogrund and Palestinian human rights activist Bassem Eid.

I have myself on numerous occasions expressed criticism of the occupation without being subjected to this community vilification:

Just prior to the disengagement from Gaza I penned an article in the quarterly Mizrachi (Orthodox Zionist) magazine. I criticised the occupation and came out in strong support of the withdrawal from Gaza. My views were certainly not supported by the majority of the Mizrachi community, but I was far from crucified. The only notable opprobrium I received was that the editor of the magazine highlighted that the views expressed were my own and not those of the Mizrachi synagogue. Vilification indeed!

But it gets worse. Geffen first claims that there is no space for criticism of the occupation in the Jewish community and then proceeds to describe the positive manner in which the delegation has been received by the community, noting the significant coverage they have obtained from the leading Jewish weekly as well as the rational and civil debate they have had with the Jewish leaders. Geffen escapes from this obvious contradiction by assuming that it’s his delegation that has made this discourse possible!

Just because events A and B both occurred does not imply that A led to B. It’s a really foolish and condescending conclusion. Perhaps Geffen feels that it’s just not possible that community institutions have previously engaged in rational debate on Israel – no, his mission has suddenly and miraculously brought civil debate to the Jewish community. Well bravo! He ignores the debates within the Jewish community where Hussein Solomon, Benjamin Pogrund, Dennis Davis, Bassem Eid etc have argued against the occupation; he ignores the addresses at the Jewish Board's annual conferences by Mosioua Lekota and Andrei Zaaiman who both stridently spoke out against the occupation. I have to conclude that Geffen is either ignorant of communal affairs or just chooses to ignore everything that doesn't fit his conclusion.

I will be the first to agree that a large majority of the community needs to be challenged regarding its positions on Israel and the occupation in particular. But recent visits from Israelis and Palestinians working towards fostering real ties between Arabs and Jews, from Israelis like former apartheid activist Benjamin Pogrund and Palestinians like Bassem Eid are evidence of a creeping enlightenment of views within the community. A delegation where leading members describe Israel as pure evil does not create space for new debate – it stifles it, marginalises the community, and shoves us back to previous defensive positions!

Most absurd, however, is that Geffen also claims that the delegation set out to try and improve the ties between the Jewish and Muslim communities in South Africa. I don’t buy it.

They blame only Israel for the problems; they lecture only the Jewish community about softening their positions; they investigate only Israeli abuses of Palestinian human rights. Everyone knows about the importance of the perception of fairness in conflict resolution. Geffen knows this. Yet, without any attempt to appear fair, he has the audacity to claim that they wanted to improve relations between South African Jews and Muslims. Who is he trying to kid?

Currying favour with one community and lecturing the other does not bring the two sides closer. It polarises the communities. It presses only the Jewish community to change its views, - not through debate but through public pressure! He calls on the Jewish community to better understand the suffering of the Palestinians (here I have to agree) but makes no similar demands of the Muslim community!

Furthermore, Geffen’s comparison between the positions adopted by the organs of the Muslim community and the organs of the Jewish community reflects complete naiveté and ignorance. In fact, he describes the failures of the Jewish community as far worse than those of the Muslim community. I challenge Geffen to actually read what the organs of both communities say. (Here Nathan, read this rhetoric from the Muslim Judicial Council and then find me similar utterances from a local Jewish communal institution).

Another telling hypocrisy is in the way Geffen describes the trauma suffered by both sides. The suffering caused by the occupation is described in human terms – it causes tremendous hardships and suffering. His description of the incessant rocket fire on Sderot however, lacks this human aspect – its failure is described in tactical terms; not as causing immense suffering to the Israelis living there, but as undermining the Israeli left and strengthening the Israeli military.

I have to conclude that the Human Rights Delegation has failed in terms of achieving at least two of their three stated objectives. Instead of trying to help the Palestinians by sharing their state-building experience, they have focused on lecturing the South African Jewish Community. If there will be any good to come from this delegation, it will be that they return to the Palestinian territories, for a longer period of time, in an effort to help the Palestinians build the insititutions that will be so vital to a future Palestinian state.

• For a really good take on the Human Rights Delegation make sure you read Joel Pollak’s article which appeared alongside Geffen’s column. You can read the full text of Pollak’s article at his blog Guide to the Perplexed.
• Michael Trapido has also weighed in with his view - read it at his Thought Leader blog: SA human rights delegation needed here.

The Rule of Law Triumphs

After 5 years of legal battles and public protests, the Israeli defense establishment has announced that it will move the security fence around Bil'in, Alfei Menashe and Tzufin closer to the green line. The decision is expected to return 2600 dunams of land that were expropriated from local Palestinians at a cost of 50 million Shekels.

The story of the construction of the security fence in this part of the country has sadly been fraught with deception and lies. The fence in the area was built in 2003 to prevent infiltrations and shooting attacks on Israeli motorists and residence. I know the area well. My family live in the Israeli village of Kochav Yair (just west of the Green line). I have personally experienced the fear (during the height of the intifada) of driving past the Palestinian town of Qalqilyah on the way to their home. I have also visited the settlement of Alfei Menashe (just to the east of the Green line) where friends of my family live. That some barrier was needed to protect these people from Palestinian violence cannot be denied. The problem was how much Palestinian land was expropriated to include these Israeli settlements and towns within the route of the fence.

On construction of the fence, Palestinians who had been adversely affected by the fences route petitioned the Supreme Court (a right afforded to all Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza) to have it moved. The Civil Administration’s Legal Counsel at the time ‘stated that the path of the fence was determined by security and topographical considerations’. But the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on handing down a decision in the case found: ‘The fence’s path has no security advantage. It is routed through an area that actually endangers troops patrolling it. On the basis of the security concepts presented to the court, the route gives cause for considerable surprise.’ Furthermore the court determined that the reason for the barriers route was based not on security but expected future settlement expansion in that region.

That the process has taken so long to move the fence to conform to the Supreme Court’s ruling is disgraceful. But the point is that it has now been done. Despite its behavior up to this point, Israel has today shown that the rule of law will ultimately triumph. This gives me tremendous hope for the future.

Last week I spent some time talking and listening to members of the SA ‘human rights’ delegation that just returned from the West Bank. A striking feature of their analysis is the permanence of Israel’s presence in the territories. They do not believe that left to its own devices Israel is willing or able to dismantle even structures that have been found illegal under Israeli law. Today Israel has proved them wrong. But this victory is only one small battle in a much larger war.

Israel, in addition to fighting Palestinian terrorism, is engaged in a desperate internal struggle against corruption. The hundreds of illegal outposts that have mushroomed in the West Bank, like the financial investigations of numerous cabinet members, are symptomatic of this. If Israel is to flourish as a Jewish and Democratic state we are going to need many more victories like this one.

Previously at IAS

• The strategic importance of Alfei Menashe
• Barrier – the seam of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict

Towards an End of Conflict

Here's an interesting analysis by Uzi Arad (formerly the Mossad's director of intelligence and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyhu's foreign policy adviser) of some potential land-swapping deals that could form part of an end of conflict deal: Trading Land for Peace.

Land swaps will definitely need to be part of any potential deal because Israel cannot relinquish the major settlement blocs.

Geographically, these blocs are situated in such a way that they could be attached either to Israel or to a Palestinian state. The various land swap plans proposing a tradeoff of territories aim to increase ethnic homogeneity and to preserve each side's basic territorial reach. In this context, land swaps allow an exchange of sovereignty over contiguous population blocs--Jewish population blocs in the West Bank proximate to the armistice line and Arab population blocs west and north of the armistice line. For example, the Gush Etzion and Ariel blocs and towns in the Jerusalem district could be exchanged for the towns and surroundings of Umm El Fahm, Arara, Bartaa, Qalansuwa, Taybe, Tira, and Kfar Kassem.

Bill Clinton was thinking along these lines in September 2000 when he proposed the "Clinton parameters". Barak got the Knesset to accept the Clinton proposals which would have ended the conflict and created a Palestinian state - but Arafat rejected.

He said that the Palestinian state should include somewhere between 94 and 96 percent of the West Bank, with a land swap of 1 to 3 percent and other territorial arrangements to compensate for the land Israel would annex for its settlement blocs. Clinton also said that any deal should allow Israel to annex 80 percent of Jewish West Bank settlers in blocs, preserve territorial contiguity for both sides, and minimize the number of affected Palestinians.

A final deal will also involve population transfers without land exchanges. I can't foresee the Palestinians allowing the settlers deep inside the West Bank that are not part of the major settlement blocs to remain. Like the Jewish residents of Gaza, these Jews will need to be transferred into Israel proper. The question then remains...in return can Israel also ask for some Arabs living in the Galilee and Negev to be resettled in Palestine?

Although the PA has been willing to consider the land swap proposals there is a moral problem which may thwart the idea. Two thirds of the Arab Israelis do not support the idea. They do not want to trade their Israeli citizenship for a Palestinian one. Ultimately they appreciate the democratic virtues that Israel offers. However a condition upon the creation of a Palestinian state would be that it must be democratic. Israel could also create certain incentives

Any land swap would likely allow Israeli Arabs assuming Palestinian sovereignty to keep whatever social welfare benefits they had as Israeli citizens, and compensation would probably be offered to offset the costs of the transition. Thus, there might actually be an economic disadvantage to staying in Israel. At present, Israeli Arabs are exempted from military or national service--a substantial economic benefit. Following a final status agreement, however, Israel is much more likely to insist that all its citizens genuinely enjoy and fulfill the state's rights and obligations, including military service.

The article concludes with an idea that is totally new to me. It talks of a multilateral land swaps - involving Egypt. This initiative suggests that

Israel transfer to Egypt some 200 to 500 square kilometers in the Negev contiguous to the Sinai Peninsula, along with a corridor across the Negev, creating a land bridge between Egypt and Jordan. In return, Egypt would transfer to the Palestinians an area twice the size of the northern Sinai, contiguous to the Gaza strip, significantly increasing the territory of one of the most densely populated areas in the world. In turn, the Palestinians would agree to Israeli sovereignty over areas in the West Bank of commensurate magnitude. The latter would include not only the contiguous Jerusalem neighborhoods and settlement blocs, but also additional territory with no Palestinian inhabitants along the Jordan River, on nature reserves in the Judean desert, and on the Dead Sea shore.

Interesting idea - not something I would support but interesting nonetheless. (Arab states can change over night. The idea of relinquishing part of Israel proper to Egypt and creating a corridor between this land and Jordan carries an unacceptable risk.)

Israel maintains maximalist positions on territory - they want to keep as many West Bank settlements as possible. Land swap deals allow Israel to compromise and step back from their maximalist demands. Ultimately none of this matters so long as the Palestinians stick to their maximalist demands on the "right of return". (Although, technically Israel could allow a subtle form of the "right or return" by allowing refugees to settle in the areas that they trade to the PA).

More Changes to Route of Security Barrier

I'm a bit slow with this one but better late than never.

Most of the naive and ignorant anti-Zionists would never believe this to be possible, but last week the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled in favour of upholding a petition submitted by Palestinians concerning the route of the Israeli security barrier.

The area under consideration is in the northern part of the West Bank near the Israeli settlement of Alfei Menashe - a settlement that even the Geneva accords suggested should be annexed by Israel.

Again the panel rejected the July 2004 International Court of Justice ruling.

The nine-justice panel, headed by Supreme Court President Aharon Barak, instructed the state to review the fence's route, including where it has already built or is under construction, and adapt it to principles which combine both security needs and Palestinian human rights. The Israel Defense Forces must come up with new solutions that would not adversely affect the quality of life of Palestinian residents as severely as the current route does, the justices ruled. The panel ruled that according to international law, an army in occupied territory is authorized to erect a fence in order to protect the lives of its own citizens, including settlers. The High Court based its ruling on regulations of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, which constitute an integral part of international law, as well as the constitutional rights of settlers under Israeli law. This decision rejects the petitioners' stance that Israel does not have the authority to build the fence beyond the Green Line and that the fence was being built for political, not security, reasons.

The Head Heeb as usual has some considered analysis

The actual route changes that will result from the ruling are hard to forecast in real time. At a guess, however, I'd predict that the route will be changed to hug existing settlement boundaries more closely, exclude Palestinian villages and eliminate the last few remaining loops that completely surround villages. This effect will be especially apparent in the Ariel salient where the planned route cuts most deeply into the West Bank; the revised route will most likely hew closely to the settlements and access roads and leave much more of the aquifer under Palestinian control. My guess is that, after the revisions are complete, the wall will encompass 4 to 5 percent of the West Bank rather than the present 7 percent: in other words, somewhere between the Taba and Geneva proposals. Given diplomatic realities, this will in all likelihood become a de facto baseline for final status negotiations.

I personally hope that the final figure is closer to 7 percent than 4 percent. Remember that land swaps along Gaza and the Southern part of the West Bank can still be used to make the annexation of the major settlement blocks more palatable for the Palestinians.

By the way, the Media Review Network is STILL using an old, pathetic and incorrect map of the security barrier in order to mislead their poor readers. The MRN allegedly exist to "monitor, analyse, dissect and evaluate distortions fabrications and double standards in the mass media." A little bit hypocritical given their persistent use of the propagandist map which they keep a link to on their front page.

Here's a map of the official revised route of the Security Fence. (The map is according the February 2005 changes...the latest changes have not been finalised.)

It's worth taking a good look at the legend of the map. Look at the key used to indicate which parts of the barrier are the dreaded concrete wall. Take a look...it really is only about 5% of the barrier. The barrier is only a concrete wall where extreme security vulnerabilities exist by Tulkarem, Kalkilya, and East Jerusalem. The rest of the barrier is a chain-link fence which is electronic, not electrified.

Understanding Disengagement

Only a short while ago, all pro-Israel (at least those centre to right of centre) bloggers were in almost complete agreement with one another. Today, two distinct groups have emerged - those that accept Prime Minister Sharon's disengagement plan, and those that don't accept it. Good arguments have been made by both sides and the debate has generally been rational and reasonable. It's worth noting that the very existence of this newfound disagreement between the pro-Israel blogs is evidence that Israel is making painful, difficult and potentially compromising (in terms of their security) decisions in order to move towards a possible end of conflict. When everyone agrees, nothing is happening. Disagreement is a sign that things are moving ahead (or behind as others may argue)  - all the while nothing seems to change in the Palestinian camp. It's a pity that Israel isn't receiving the credit due for even considering these moves.

Arguments for and against the disengagement are often provided, but here is a quick look at what the disengagement plan actually is - as described by the Israeli government.

1. General

Israel has concluded that there is currently no reliable Palestinian partner with which it can make progress in a bilateral peace process. Accordingly, it has developed a plan of unilateral disengagement, based on the following considerations:

i. The stalemate dictated by the current situation is harmful. In order to break out of this stalemate, Israel is required to initiate moves not dependent on Palestinian cooperation.

ii. The assumption is that, in any future permanent status arrangement, there will be no Israeli towns and villages in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it is clear that in the West Bank, there are areas which will be part of the State of Israel, including cities, towns and villages, security areas and installations, and other places of special interest to Israel.

iii. The relocation from the Gaza Strip and from Northern Samaria (as delineated on Map) will reduce friction with the Palestinian population, and carries with it the potential for improvement in the Palestinian economy and living conditions.

iv. The hope is that the Palestinians will take advantage of the opportunity created by the disengagement to break out of the cycle of violence and reengage in a process of dialogue.

v. The process of disengagement will serve to dispel claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

When there is evidence from the Palestinian side of its willingness, capability and implementation in practice of the fight against terrorism and the institution of reform as required by the Road Map, it will be possible to return to the track of negotiation and dialogue.

2. Main elements

Gaza Strip

Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip, including all existing Israeli towns and villages, and will redeploy outside the Strip. This will not include military deployment in the area of the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt ("the Philadelphi Route"). Upon completion of this process, there will no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces or civilians in the evacuated areas of Gaza Strip territory. Thus there will be no basis for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory.

West Bank

1. Israel will evacuate an area in the Northern Samaria Area including 4 villages and all military installations, and will redeploy outside the vacated area.

2. On completion of this process, there will no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli security forces or civilians in the Northern Samaria Area.

3. The move will enable territorial contiguity for Palestinians in the Northern Samaria Area.

4. Israel will improve the transportation infrastructure in the West Bank in order to facilitate the contiguity of Palestinian transportation.

5. The process will facilitate Palestinian economic and commercial activity in the West Bank.

The implications of this plan for the Jewish residents of the areas to be evacuated are difficult to bear  - the Israeli Courts ruled that the evacuation does amount to a violation of their human rights but still ruled in favour of the plan submitting that the interests of the State must be put before the interests of individuals.

Israel will continue to build the security fence, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court. The route will take into account humanitarian considerations.

Disengagement Tactics

Here's a tactical rundown on how disengagement from Gaza is expected to be handled: This Way Out.

The IDF has outlined three scenarios that could occur, with their current predicted scenario worryingly hovering somewhere between the average to the worst scenario. Some officers take a more optimistic approach, believing that the many months that have passed since the plan was announced will have conditioned the settlers to the idea of the disengagement.

The historic withdrawal is expected to begin in Gaza on July 25 August 15 and in Samaria on August 15. By the beginning of the next Israeli school year, there will be not a single Jew left in Gaza or the Northern West Bank.

Keep in mind that it is not possible for Israel to just withdraw the military from these areas, leaving the Jewish residents to live under the PA. The PA won't even for a moment consider that option, knowing that a massacre would take place.

The assumed scenario The IDF has defined three scenarios based on what can be expected from the local Palestinians and the Jewish settlers once disengagement commences. Regarding the Jewish settlers, the optimistic scenario envisions very limited demonstrations, with the bulk of opponents from Judea and Samaria successfully kept out. The second scenario sees a vocal opposition, joined by large numbers of supporters from outside Gaza, that will physically resist the evacuation, with the possibility of isolated shooting. The third scenario imagines all-out opposition from the settlers, including large-scale refusal to obey soldiers' orders, incitement and acts of terror against Israeli forces. The current army prediction is somewhere between the second and third scenarios. There will not be any change made in the orders for opening fire, a senior officer said. Standing orders call for soldiers to neutralize any life-threatening danger they face with the minimum necessary force.

The IDF will be recalling all weapons issued by the Ministry of Defense to the Jewish residents of Gaza. They may even confiscate personal weapons held by those with permits from the ministry of interior. Israel is serious about this, unlike the PA who in violation of the DOP refused to confiscate the illegal weapons used by the terrorists.

What about the Palestinians?

The three possible scenarios regarding the Palestinians include one of limited hostile acts, mostly along the corridors, with the hope that the Palestinian Authority would be able to control the street. The concern would be of a "Hizbullah"-type model of non-violent marching on Jewish settlements. (In south Lebanon, 2,000 civilians marching with Hizbullah flags peacefully stormed SLA outposts as the militia collapsed and fled.) The second scenario anticipates only limited PA control, with terrorist groups staging sporadic mortar fire and Kassam rocket attacks, in addition to sniping at soldiers and at the settlements while they are evacuated. Sderot and border kibbutzim could also come under rocket attacks. The final - and worst-case - scenario would be an all-out assault on the IDF and settlements as well as on the massive camps around the Gaza Strip. In this scenario, PA forces would have no control, or would even participate in the attacks. Although the second scenario is considered the most likely, as of early March, the IDF has opted to deploy its forces for a worst-case scenario. Others in the IDF say the Palestinians will never fight terror until a final-status arrangement is on the negotiating table.

This is typical of the PA and was their strategy during Olso. The Declaration of Principles (DOP) called for an interim self government for the Palestinians and a phased IDF withdrawal from the territories over several years. Both sides agreed and signed the accords. When terror increased during the years after the DOP was signed, the Palestinian stock response was that the intifada will not end until the occupation is over - i.e. they wont fight terror until the occupation ends. But the DOP which they were party to called for a phased withdrawal - i.e the occupation would end over several years instead of a big bang approach. This gave the terrorists a carte blanche for attacks over a protracted period in flagrant violation of the accords.

Sharon is not using this attitude as an excuse to stall all progress. Instead he is withdrawing without coordination with the PA. He understands that they will use the excuse of the occupation and so he will act unilaterally until he delivers an environment conducive to final status negotiations.

Israel has a plan called "5 concentric circles" to implement disengagement.

Five concentric circles The IDF plan for the Gaza Strip calls for isolating areas and protecting them with a number of buffer zones so they are out of range of any attempted Palestinian attack. The outer, fifth circle will be, of course, the IDF and police force, playing the role of "goalie" to prevent access to the general area. The fourth circle will involve special blocking units in key positions to intercept any reinforcements from reaching the vicinity of the settlements. The third is an offensive circle, where troops will preemptively reoccupy large swaths of Palestinian areas to keep mortars out of range. In these cases, the IDF will clamp a curfew on the Palestinian areas and heavily armed forces will reoccupy them until every last settler and their possessions have been removed. The second circle is the immediate protective shield the army will provide. This includes taking over access roads up to 200 meters on each side and securing the perimeter of settlements. The inner circle will comprise the forces who will do the actual evacuation. At press time, 90 percent were expected to be police. The rest will be female soldiers and positions that the police are unable to fill, such as rabbis who will remove mezuzot from doorposts.

What happens to the existing infrastructure?

For the moment, the plan is to destroy all the houses but to leave intact public buildings and agricultural structures, such as green houses. All the synagogues are to be demolished. This decision was made mainly to prevent images of Palestinians looting the abandoned settlements. But negotiations are currently underway to sell them to a third party or to the Palestinian Authority.

The Unthinkable

I missed this Ha'aretz report saying that Mahmoud Abbas is ready to concede on one of the main stumbling blocks preventing an end of conflict solution.

Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas will tell militant Palestinian factions meeting in Cairo Tuesday that the right of return of refugees should be looked upon "realistically," and that not all Palestinian exiles will return to former homes in Israel and the territories, Israel Radio said, quoting the London-based Asharq al-Awsat newspaper. Palestinian sources told the paper that Abbas will tell the participants in the Cairo parley that the right of return cannot be fully implemented, and that those who cannot return should be granted compensation.

Tuesday has come and gone, but unfortunately there were no reports confirming this announcement. This should still be considered a positive development since these reports condition the Palestinian public for what they will eventually need to concede on. In the lead-up to Camp David, Ehud Barak cunningly released a steady stream of leaks to the media, which readied the Israeli public for the concessions he was about to make.

Of course, no Israeli PM will ever concede on the refugees issue. The idea is to end up with one Palestinian state, not two. Barak however, did agree to the idea of compensating the refugees to the tune of US$30 Billion.