It's Almost Supernatural

Peace

This is the start of a new category which is long overdue. An abundance of noxious myths have been doing the rounds, creating a new 'revisionist' impression of the amazing events that took place in 2000 - during Camp David, the start of the Intifada, and then with the Clinton parameters. Most of what I present will be based on Dennis Ross' account of what happened. Dennis Ross was the lead US envoy to the Middle East from 1988 until 2001. No outsider put more effort into achieving peace than Dennis Ross did. He was the lead negotiator between the Israelis and the Palestinians and orchestrated almost every summit or conference that took place during the last decade.

Today, and especially since the death of Arafat, an opinion exists that the onus is on Israel to restart the peace process. This is both misguided and dangerous. To be a proponent of this deluded view, one must completely forget about Camp David and the Clinton parameters that followed. The unyielding Palestinian behaviour at Camp David, followed by their rejection of the Clinton parameters in Dec 2000 taught us that no matter how ready and willing Israel may be for compromise, it is the Palestinian leadership that will ultimately decide whether peace is possible.

Ehud Barak played the role that many today demand from Ariel Sharon. Barak accepted compromises on Jerusalem and the Jordan valley that were as dear to the Jewish people as the “right of return” is to the Palestinians.

Not only did Barak’s government accept the Clinton parameters, but he readied the Israeli public for peace. Barak released a steady stream of leaks to the media, indicating what Israel was prepared to give up on. This prepared his public for the concessions that were about to be made.

No such strategy was followed by the Palestinians. Their public was never prepared for peace and compromise. Instead Arafat indoctrinated them into a belief that they would receive all their demands. Peacemaking can never succeed in an environment dominated by mythologies and untruths. Barring an end to the incitement in the media and classrooms , the Palestinian leadership will never be able to deliver on any potential agreements.

When there is a Palestinian leadership prepared to make clear that there is a legitimate way to pursue their cause and an illegitimate way to do so peace will no longer be a dream. And even if the Israeli government is not ready for the compromises then the Israeli public will insist that they be made.

Dennis Ross describes this as one of history’s lessons. The Israelis will demand that any government respond when they believe they have a partner. They showed that with Sadat and Begin. They showed it by voting Shamir and then Netanyahu out of office replacing them with Rabin and Barak, and they showed it in response to Camp David in 2000. But the opposite will also apply. Israel needs to continue to demonstrate that the consequence of Palestinian violence will not be Israeli concessions, but increasing Israeli demands.

The Syrian Track

UN envoy to the Middle East Terje Roed Larsen reports that Assad is ready to resume the peace talks with Israel "without conditions".

I won't be expecting too much from the "without conditions" statement. It's similar to how Assad's father first demanded "full withdrawal" as a basis for agreement, only to change his tack when he saw the Israelis were willing to do business - pocketing any concessions and using them as a point of departure rather than a point of conclusion. The initial talks between Rabin and Hafez Al-Assad were based on "full withdrawal" from the Golan Heights. As Rabin moved closer towards Assad, Assad stepped further away. Assad later defined "full withdrawal" to mean full withdrawal to the 1967 lines. To Rabin "full withdrawal" meant withdrawal to the international border, and not the June 1967 lines.

What was the difference? The international border is the mandate border from 1923. It therefore reflected the original border between Israel and Syria. The 67 lines didn't exist on any map. They represented the positions of the two sides on the eve of the 67 war. The difference between the two lines resulted from the war of independence in 1948. By 1949 the Syrians had captured some Israeli territory to the west of the 1923 lines. As part of the armistice agreement Syria withdrew from these lines and returned to the international border, making these demilitarised zones. The actual difference between the two lines was a mere 66 square kilometers, but for the Israelis that area affected their ability to control the east bank of the lake Kineret - their major source of water. Syria wanted it both ways - they wanted Israel to withdraw from territory captured in 67, but were refusing to allow Israel to return to the territory that they controlled as per the international border.

The negotiations carried on without much success. Eventually Israel moved closer to the Syrian demands. Israel eventually agreed to withdraw on the basis of the 67 lines, as long as they could get a couple of hundred meters off the coast of Lake Kineret.

The negotiations eventually ended in early 2000 when Assad refused to even listen to an amazing proposal from Clinton of what Barak could accept. Barak was willing to withdraw on the basis on the 67 lines as long as he had some territory to the east of the Kineret shoreline. In detailing his offer, Barak drew a line on a map that was just to the east of the Jordan river, and south of it he drew a line off lake Kineret - " a few hundred meters off the shoreline." He was prepared to compensate moving the border (from 67) in the north slightly east by moving the border in the southern part of the lake slightly to the west. Assad would therefore still end up with more territory than the international border stipulated.

The following map is my representation of the line drawn by Barak.

As you can see, the line I drew in is to the west of the line in the south, and to the east of it in the north. This allowed for the sum total of territory that Syria would receive, to remain exactly as Assad demanded.

The proposal in 2000 was made in Geneva. Clinton started the presentation with what he thought would be an easy point, in order to gather momentum. He detailed that Israel had finally agreed to Assad's demand - full withdrawal to the June 1967 lines based on a "commonly agreed border."

Assad's reponse surprised even right wing Israelis. He immediately said "this is a problem." June 1967 was Assad's mantra, this is what he repeatedly sought, and yet now he was objecting. Was he objecting that the border would be "commonly agreed?" Dennis Ross points out that the language Clinton proposed was the exact language used as a demand by the top Syrian negotiator in earlier talks!

Thus the Syrian-Israeli talks came to an abrupt end. I fully support Sharon's stance on this issue - that Syria must first show that they are serious by cracking down on the terrorist training camps on Syrian soil, as well ending their role as a channel to funnel arms from Iran to Hizbulla. Until the Arab world accepts Israel's moral legitimacy negotiations will be futile - only then will Arab leaders be able to justify compromises.

For an account of the Syrian Israeli talks see this Daniel Pipes review.