The furore over the “New Israeli historians” has long interested me and so I decided to read the book “Fabricating Israeli History” by Ephraim Karsh. In the book Karsh presents thoroughly researched evidence to suggest that many of the theories espoused by the “new historians” (among them Benny Morris – famous for turning his back on the left that for so long held him as their hero) were a product of selective quoting, use of secondary material instead of source material, and the misunderstanding or deliberate distorting of the context of certain quotes.
The idea of ‘transfer’ of the Palestinians to neighbouring Arab states has been one of the most charged issues in the historiography of the Israeli Arab conflict. The Palestinian view sees the Palestinians as hapless victims of a Jewish grand design to rob them of their land. The Israelis deny the existence of any such intention and view the Palestinian tragedy as a self inflicted disaster by an extremist and short-sighted leadership which consistently rejected all compromise solutions that would have averted its people’s tragic fate.
Context of the Transfer Discussion
In his study of the origins of the Palestinian refugee problem, Benny Morris reached the common sense conclusion that the tragedy was ‘born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab’. He found no evidence in support of the standard Arab claim that the Yishuv (Jewish community in Israel before 1948) entered the 47-49 war with a master plan to expel the Arabs. Yet he maintained that from the mid 1930’s most of the Yishuv’s leaders including Ben Gurion wanted to establish a Jewish state without an Arab minority, and supported the “transfer solution” to this minority problem. Morris has thus been challenged by both sides: The Palestinian camp charge him of a Zionist partisanship, for denying that Israel entered the war of independence in order to expel all Arabs. The Israeli camp charge him of manipulating and distorting the truth, arguing that “transfer” was never discussed in the context of a solution or active policy to be pursued by the Jewish state-to-be.
Karsh shows that on the idea of transfer Morris made serious acts of omission which totally invalidate his claim that the idea had a basis in mainstream Jewish thinking, if not planning from the late 1930s and 1940s.
Karsh points out that Morris fails to place the transfer discussion within its true context, namely in response to the Peel commission recommendations of July 1937. In its report the Peel commission recommended the partition of Mandatory Palestine into two states (Arab and Jewish). By way of reducing the friction between the two communities the commission recommended a population exchange (read “transfer”) between the Jewish and Arab states. A ‘population exchange committee’ was created to study the matter, only to disband quietly the following summer after concluding that the idea was stillborn, not least because the British backed down from their recommendation. “Transfer” was only ever considered if it were to be the British that implemented it. Once the British backed down, it was never again considered.
The lion’s share of Morris’ assertions comes from the 1937-1938 period, or more precisely, from three Jewish Agency Executive (JAE) meetings. Contrary to Morris’ claim that these meetings debated at length the idea of transfer the issue was discussed only in the last meeting, and even then only as part of an element in the overall balance of risks and opportunities attending Britain’s suggested partition rather than as a concrete policy option. The other two meetings did not discuss the idea at all.
Karsh shows how important sentences by Ben Gurion, quoted by Morris had been omitted in order for Morris to create the evidence necessary to prove his argument. One such sentence in a conversation that Ben Gurion had with his son Omri omitted is “all our aspiration is built on the assumption – proven throughout all our activity – that there is enough room for ourselves and the Arabs in Palestine.” Why would transfer be considered as an option if Ben Gurion felt that there was enough space in Palestine for Jews and Arabs? Of course, the answer to that question suggests Morris’ intent in omitting the sentence from his evidence.
Karsh points out many examples of similar misrepresentations and it appears that Morris relied on secondary sources of information for his theories instead of checking the original sources.
Lines of Action
Morris accuses Ben Gurion of proposing the “Lines of Action” for the Jewish state to be as a way of endorsing the “transfer” option. “The Jewish state will discuss with the neighbouring Arab states the matter of voluntarily transferring Arabs from the Jewish state to the neighbouring Arab states.”
Morris errs since he falsely creates the impression that the Lines of Action were proposed in the midst of a lengthy discussion of the transfer idea and that these lines revolved ipso facto around the idea. They did not. There was no discussion of transfer in that meeting and only one of the 28 lines of action dealt with the voluntary transfer of some Arabs who of their own free will, would choose to leave the Jewish state.
About half of the lines did not deal with the Arab question at all and those that did were based on the assumption that most Arabs would stay in the Jewish state as equal citizens, rather than be expelled. Second, the concomitance of Jewish immigration and the voluntary transfer of some Arabs attributed to Ben Gurion by Morris is patently false. What Ben Gurion actually said was that neither of these two issues contradicted the commitment of the Jewish state to complete non discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, religion, sex, or class. In fact of the 18 pages of the Lines of Action only 4 lines referred to the transfer idea. The Lines of Action were dedicated almost exclusively to the position of the Arab population in the Jewish state and were aimed at incorporating this community into the state as full and equal citizens, including the adoption of the necessary affirmative action to this end, not at their mass eviction as implied by Morris.
At the meeting there were two brief references to the transfer option, but these were brief and were only in passing and none kindled any discussion. Ben Gurion in no way endorsed the idea; his response reflected the perception of the Arab minority as a bridge between the Jewish state and its Arab neighbours. The meeting rather focused on the affirmative action that had to be taken on behalf of the Arab minority.
The second allusion to the transfer idea was made by Werner David Senator “if Zionism will not be able to solve the question of Jewish Arab coexistence in the state, he (senator) will personally consider it the failure of Zionism to fulfil its moral promises to the Jewish people. There is of course another solution, namely the transfer of the Arabs as suggested by the peel commission. Had this been feasible – he would have supported it- otherwise we have no other way but to observe real equality between Jews and Arabs in the Jewish state…if we will not do everything to give the Arabs real equality we will bring disaster on the Jewish state.”
This was the second allusion to transfer in the meeting but it was neither made in the context of a discussion of the idea, nor did it suggest that the issue was to be discussed.
A Jewish Majority
Karsh argues that the omission of crucial information was used often by Morris, citing the example of a Ben Gurion speech in July 1947 just as hostilities between Arabs and Jews broke out. Morris ends a paragraph by Ben Gurion on the respective populations of each group as follows: “There can be no stable and strong Jewish state as long as it has a Jewish majority of only 60%.” Ben Gurion goes on that they need to adopt a new solution to deal with this problem. Morris ends his account of the speech there, implying that the new solution was that of transfer.
Morris omits Ben Gurion’s next sentence which says that …so long as it has a majority of only 60% and so long as there are only 600 000 Jews.
Morris distorts Ben Gurion’s intention by narrowing the picture to a preoccupation with the 60-40 percent ratio, when its real scope was a concern for the absolute size of the Jewish population. The original text makes clear the alternative solution to this problem- aliyah – Jewish immigration.
Karsh shows that the original text went on to state: “the creation of the state is not the principal conclusion. …In order to ensure not only the establishment of the Jewish state but its existence and destiny as well - we must bring a million and a half Jews to the country and root them here. It is only when there will be at least 2 million Jews that the state will be truly established."
This provides concrete evidence that the “new solution” referred to earlier was not “transfer” but rather aliyah, further enhanced by his remarks that there is enough land for both the Jews and Arabs.
His long term solution to the 60-40 problem was clear and unequivocal – mass Jewish immigration.
As for the position of the Arabs in Israel he could not be clearer:
"We must think in terms of a state, in terms of independence, in terms of full responsibility for ourselves – and for others. In our state there will be non-Jews as well – and all of them will be equal citizens; equal in everything without any exception; that is the state will be their state as well. The attitude of the Jewish state to its Arab citizens will be an important factor – though not the only one- in building good neighbourly relations with the Arab states. If the Arab citizen will feel at home in our state, and if his status will not be in the least different from the Jew, and perhaps better off that the status of an Arab in an Arab state, and if the state will help him in a truthful and dedicated way to reach the economic, social, and cultural level of the Jewish community, then the Arab distrust will accordingly subside and a bridge to a Semitic Jewish- Arab alliance, will be built…the striving for a Jewish Arab alliance necessitates us to fulfil several obligations, which we are obliged to do in any event; full and real equality, de jure and de facto, of all the states citizens; graduated equalization of the economic, social, and cultural standard of living of the Arab community with that if the Jewish community; recognition of the Arabic language as the language of the Arab citizen in the administration, courts of justice, and above all, schools; municipal autonomy in villages and cities etc."
Ben Gurion envisaged a true partnership among equal citizens. History perhaps proves the naivety of Ben Gurion’s ideology but history also proves the existence of that ideology as the Israeli Arabs living in Umm Al Fahm have unwittingly testified. In 2000 as part of a final deal between the Israelis and Palestinians a population swap was proposed whereby the Arab village of Umm Al Fahm would become Palestinian. The residents of Umm Al Fahm rejected the suggestion outright. They were happy to be Israeli citizens and refused to lose that citizenship in return for Palestinian citizenship.
Very good!
Posted by: peet_g | April 20, 2006 at 11:19
Karsh is wrong - Ben-Gurion and the others were careful to talk soothingly about the Arabs and not mention "transfer" openly, but he's recorded boasting of how much Israel had already succeeded in doing in 1937 at the Zionist conference. (Morris's response explains two-faced politicians much better than I can do).
And Karsh is wrong about the Peel Committee, which recommended partition and transfer (250,000 Palestinians to lose their homes, 1,250 immigrants to do so) to the British government - which rejected it, as they'd rejected every other suggestion.
Still, this discussion is barren - Israelis have kept the Palestinians out of their homes with guns for 60 years now, but it's coming apart on them. Nobody believes in a "Light unto the Nations" or "Purity of Arms" any more, no Israeli wants to fight. They all want to get out, and all the sons and daughters of the leading Zionists are doing precisely that.
Posted by: Andy Dyer | September 19, 2007 at 20:42