At the moment I am reading Dennis Ross’ 800 pager “The Missing Peace”. Every now and then I will share some of the more interesting anecdotes from the book, and I will start with one about our clever terrorist Yasir Arafat.
First off, who is Dennis Ross? From 1988 to 2000 Ross was the US Middle East envoy and lead negotiator in the presidential administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton. Today he is the director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
This excerpt reflects just how calculating Yasir Arafat can be. The context is the early phase of Oslo (1994) when what is known as the “May 4 agreement” was signed. The agreement would create the Palestinian Authority and bring Arafat from Tunis to Gaza and Jerico.
Hosni Mubarak had invited Rabin and Arafat to Cairo for the historic signing ceremony. The night before the ceremony Mubarak brought Arafat, Rabin, the negotiators, Dennis Ross and Secretary of State Warren Christopher together. The meeting intended to run through the signing ceremony and to iron out any unresolved issues. What follows is excerpted from the book pages 134-135.
Around 2 a.m., we brought everyone together in a four-way meeting in the conference room to try and resolve the remaining differences. Mubarak asked Rabin to give us a status report. He reported that there were three open issues: the size of the Jerico district, the issue of a single Palestinian policeman on the Allenby Bridge, and the exact location of the joint patrols in the “yellow zone” in Gaza. Osama al Baz (Egyptian presidential aide) asked if it was possible to keep these issues open and continue discussions but conclude the agreement anyway. Rabin felt that only the yellow zone issue needed to be resolved now; the others could continue to be discussed. Arafat said nothing. Moussa (Egyptian Foreign Minister) asked “What do you need in the yellow zone?” Arafat wanted joint patrols to show a Palestinian presence. Then I asked if it was possible to phase in the patrols and postpone the other issues over the next few months. Arafat said yes, over the next three months. Mubarak said “so we have an agreement?” Rabin said yes. Mubarak then declared that the signing ceremony could be held at 11 a.m. Everything seemed done and then suddenly, as if we had not just had the discussion, Arafat asked, “What about the Jerico district, the policeman, and the joint patrols?”
Amnon Shahak (Head of IDF) could not contain himself and began to laugh. Arafat said, “You think I am a joke? You think I am a joke?” To which Rabin responded, “No, we take you very seriously, let us go over this again.” He did and Arafat again agreed on the compromise we had just been over. Ending, I thought, the endgame.
But I was wrong. Arafat reserved the real melodrama for the next day.
On live TV, in front of the world, with Mubarak, Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Rabin, and Shimon Peres all onstage, Arafat would not sign the maps. As Rabin’s face turned progressively redder and Mubarak, Moussa, and Peres took turns trying to persuade him to sign, Arafat was unyielding. Nabil Sha’ath, the Palestinian who had negotiated the final text did not know what the problem was. Nor did Yasser Abed Rabbo. No-one could explain what was happening. After about twenty minutes of stalemate on the stage I [Ross] went up on stage and called a brief recess to try and resolve the problem.
Once off, Rabin turned to Arafat and bluntly asked “What is your problem?” Arafat said “Will you agree to discuss the size of the Jerico district, and the policeman on the bridge over the next three months?” Rabin said “I agreed last night to that.” Arafat said “Okay, I am ready to sign.”
Unbeknownst to Arafat or Rabin, after we had reached agreement at two-thirty in the morning, I had asked [our main drafter] to put the agreements in writing. He had done so, and Arafat and Rabin had signed all the documents stopping only when Arafat refused to sign the maps. So what Arafat wanted in writing, he and Rabin had already signed.
Why had Arafat balked? Obviously not for the reasons he indicated to us. No, here Arafat, on a world stage, was demonstrating to his [Palestinian] public that [he would stand up for their rights in a way that would add to his charismatic appeal…]
His behaviour in Cairo had one longer term consequence. Hosni Mubarak would, from this time on, be reluctant to play a guiding or forward-leaning role in a negotiation. While he may send envoys, meet the leaders separately, or help on security and terror questions, he would never again play peacemaker – and risk having Arafat burn him again.
Excerpt taken from “The Missing Peace”, Dennis Ross, 0-374-19973-6, Farrar Straus and Giroux New York, 2004.
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